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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
EHR: Electronic Health Records 
 
EMR: Electronic Medical Records 
 
HIPAA: Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
 










Data breach: An impermissible use or disclosure under the HIPAA Privacy Rule that 
 compromises the security or privacy of the protected health information (HHS, 
 2014).  
 
Electronic Health Records: Go beyond the data provided by the collector's office and 
 include a more comprehensive patient history. They are designed to contain and 
 share information from all providers involved in a patient's care. They can be 
 created, managed, consulted and consumed by authorized providers and staff from 
 across more than one health care organization (HealthIT.gov, 2014).  
 
Electronic Medical Records: A digital version of a paper chart that contains all of a 
patient's medical history from one practice. It is mostly used by providers for 
diagnosis and treatment (HealthIT.gov, 2014). 
 
HIPAA: HIPAA is an acronym for the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
 Act that was passed by Congress in 1996. HIPAA does the following: provides 
the ability to transfer and continue health insurance coverage for millions of 
American workers and their families when they change or lose their jobs 
(HHS.gov, 2014). 
 
HITECH: HITECH stands for Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical 
Health. The provisions of the HITECH Act are specifically designed to work 
together to provide the necessary assistance and technical support to providers, 
enable coordination and alignment within and among states, establish connectivity 
to the public health community in case of emergencies, and assure the workforce 
is properly trained and equipped to be meaning users of certified Electronic 
Health Records (HealthIT, 2014).  
 
Medical Identity Theft: The fraudulent use of an individual's identifying information in a 
health care setting to fraudulently obtain medical services, prescription drugs or 
goods, including attempts to commit fraudulent billing, or for financial gain 
(Ponemon, 2013).  
 
Provider: A provider of medical or health services, or any other organization who 
 furnishes, bills, or is paid for health care in the normal course of business  






Social engineering: Non-technical intrusions that rely on human interaction and often 
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This study explores the relationship between a person's knowledge of risk and their 
behavior with their use of online medical information. Medical information is gathered 
and recorded with a variety of methods and stored in a multitude of locations. Laws exist, 
however, breaches and leakages of medical data occur, typically through loss or theft. 
Lost and stolen medical information has potentially numerous nefarious purposes 
including medical identity theft. Medically identifying information can be made more 
vulnerable through careless use and oversight by both medical entities and consumers. 
While a person may be knowledgeable or aware of information security risk concepts, 
principles or practices, does knowledge of information security risk have a correlation to 






CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Electronic medical records are an evolving industry, with issues such as 
regulations, access controls, training and policies requiring attention and resolution. At 
stake is consumer privacy and protection from issues such as theft, data breaches, loss, 
inaccuracies, exposure of personal data and medical identity theft. Electronic medical 
records are found at insurance companies, clinics, hospitals, employers and government 
agencies as well as the network that transmits them and ultimately stores them. This 
creates concerns for the integrity of electronic medical records and the handling of these 
records during their lifecycle as sensitive data can be viewed, accessed or compromised 
during collection, transmission and storage. Access to these records through these points 
in the electronic lifecycle can compromise data integrity or result in exposure or theft. 
 
1.1 Problem Statement 
 Choosing to use electronic medical records spans a wide cross section, from those 
with little to no knowledge of the potential risk, to highly skilled users aware of the 
inherent risk. Does this knowledge of risk have an association to how comfortable a 








The scope of this paper was a study of individuals that measures how their 
knowledge of risk influences their comfort level when using online electronic medical 
records. The survey was a convenience sampling of at least 385 adults. The goal was to 
get as large of a cross section of adults as possible to participate. While convenience 
sampling allows for quick data analysis and theory formation, the chance for bias is 
greater than with other sampling types. The measures were twofold: first a measure of the 
individual's knowledge of risk and then a measure of their comfort level when using 
online medical records. The measure of risk knowledge was classified by the level of 
knowledge. These results were then compared to determine if there was then any 
correlation on their attitudes toward electronic medical record use. 
 
1.3 Significance of the Problem 
Medical data leakages and breaches can take a variety of forms that may 
compromise a variety of data. Some of these include personally identifiable patient or 
employee information and business related information such as financial or marketing 
data. Breaches can result from theft and losses of laptops, breached servers or simply 
unattended files. 
The Ponemon Institute (2013) reports that instances of medical identity theft 
are on the rise, from 1.4 million people in 2010 to 1.85 million in 2012. It is 





were fraud related (Ponemon, 2013). The resulting consequences of these data leakages 
and breaches vary for the patient. A patient may be responsible for fraudulent changes for 
treatment obtained under the patient's identity, which can then result in service limit 
restrictions on an insurance policy. They may face incorrect information in a patient 
record, potentially threatening the health or life of a patient or negatively impacting 
medical decisions made with that data (Taitsman, Grimm, & Agrawal, 2013).   
Providers can shoulder the burden of illegal activity from fraudulent or 
exaggerated billing, assuming these are paid on behalf of legitimate patient activity. 
When the criminal activity is discovered, the patient may then be left with unpaid service 
bills. Insurance companies covering fraudulent services or products may pass these along 
the form of increased premiums and copayments.  
Up to 10 percent of health payments paid through Medicare and Medicaid are 
reportedly due to criminal activity. This includes medical identity theft and corrupt health 
care providers. Total fraudulent expenditures range from three to ten percent, which 
translates to hundreds of billions of dollars (Ponemon, 2013). 
When Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries are compromised, taxpayers are left 
with the financial burden. It is estimated that over 300,000 accounts may currently be 
compromised and are monitored by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 






1.4 Statement of Purpose 
The goal of this study was to determine if a correlation exists between 
respondents' knowledge of information security risks and their comfort in using online 
medical data. The survey was a convenience sampling of at least 385 adults. The goal 
was to get as large of a cross section of adults as possible to participate to measure not 
only if there is a correlation between the two variables but if age or gender further plays a 
part in the correlation. The measures were twofold: first a measure of the individual's 
knowledge of risk, then a measure of their attitudes toward electronic medical record use. 
The measure of risk was classified by level, from low to high levels of information 
security knowledge. The comfort levels of online medical record use were classified from 
very uncomfortable to very comfortable. These levels of knowledge were then  compared 
to determine if there was then any correlation between information security risk 
knowledge and the comfort levels toward electronic medical record use. The hypothesis 
was that those who score higher in risk analysis knowledge would report less comfort 
when using online medical systems. The analyses examined the correlation between the 
two variables and determined which direction these may take, whether it was a positive 
or negative correlation. Ideally, the analysis was to further determine any correlations 
between age and gender of the respondents and how their responses may differ with other 






1.5 Research Question 
The research question central to this research asks whether a person's level of 




The following assumptions were inherent to this study: 
1. The need exists for a demonstration of a person's perception of risk in 
relation to their behavior with medically identifying data. 
2. Participants will provide truthful answers to survey questions. 
3. The survey questions are designed to gain straightforward, clear responses 
4. without giving direction or suggestion of estimated outcomes.   
5. Respondents are proficient on how to use and navigate the Internet. 
 
1.7 Delimitations 
The delimitations of this study include: 
1. The nature of this research may review only a portion of a respondent's 
 knowledge of risk analysis.  
2. The only factors in this study are age and gender. 







The limitations inherent to this study include: 
1.  The survey was a convenience survey over the Internet and attempted to 
 encompass roughly 385 participants. 
2.  There may have been some respondents who failed to complete the 
 survey or did not follow proper instructions. 
3.  The research was a two-part survey where one part may have impacted an 
 answer or perception of a question given on the next part of the survey. 
4.  The response rate for a convenience sample may not be large, which can 
 increase non-response bias. 
 
1.9 Summary 
This chapter has described the motivations for this study. It has presented the 
scope, significance of the problem, and the research question. It also described a list of 
assumptions, delimitations and limitations. The next chapter discusses the current 
relevant literature covering risks associated with medically identifying information and 







CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In recent years, medical record organization, storage and use has transitioned to 
electronic formats from paper-based methods. There are many benefits to this transition. 
Fernandez-Aleman, Senor, Lozoya (2013) point out that electronic records can be 
cheaper to administer, can reduce overall costs, improves the quality of care and 
encourage more efficient record keeping and mobility. Security and privacy of these 
electronic health records has evolved with the threats of exploitation, which includes 
medical identity theft. The various cascading effects, including personal health, financial 
wellbeing, provider and public health concerns, will be discussed. How a person's 
knowledge of risk impacts their choice and quantity of information they provide and how 
they interact with electronic medical information will be presented as well. 
 
2.1 Government Regulations 
The Federal government has introduced legislation to implement and regulate 
electronic medical record use and is pushing to create a national network of electronic 
health records by 2014. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
of 1996 established a framework for privacy and security that requires                                                                                
compliance in transmission and disclosure of certain patient data (Taitsman, Grimm & 





worker changing or losing their job, as well as standards for electronic transmission of 
personally identifiable healthcare information (Camp & Johnson, 2013). The Privacy and 
Security Rules within HIPAA deal with ensuring that participating parties operate under 
standardized administrative safeguards such as policies and procedures as well as 
physical and data structure access control and integrity (Camp & Johnson, 2013).  
 The purpose behind the creation of the Health Information Technology for 
Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH) was to give structure to protecting medical 
identity security and privacy. It builds on HIPAA by notifying consumers of breaches of 
HIPAA-covered information holders or third party vendors (Taitsman et al., 2013). It was 
created as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 to press for the 
development and implementation of electronic medical record framework as well as 
offering lucrative incentives to hospitals and practitioners to adopt electronic medical 
records. In addition, it extends the HIPAA breach notification requirements to covered 
business associates as well as introducing new consequences for non-compliance.   
 The Department of Health and Human Services implemented requirements of 
secured and unsecured health care data after HITECH was passed 2009. It specifically 
requires encryption of electronic health care records, with practitioners destroying 
unencrypted data after it is used. This requirement also extends to HIPAA covered 
entities and their business partners. HITECH also increased fines under HIPAA (Camp & 
Johnson, 2013). Ironically, HIPAA can restrict resolving medical identity theft as the 
perpetrator's information can be protected under the law, thus restricting the disclosure to 





Fernandez-Aleman et al., (2013) make the point that while there has been much 
movement toward implementing electronic records, there has been comparatively little 
activity toward developing policies that address the emerging issues surrounding their use. 
They discuss how there exists a variety of access points to a patient's records by a variety 
of staff or facilities. A patient's record may be accessible from multiple facilities and 
therefore, vulnerable to a variety of different system security policies and procedures 
(Fernandez-Aleman et al., 2013). 
 
2.2 Risks to Consumers 
According to the Ponemon Institute study (2013), it is estimated that medical data 
breaches cost $6.5 billion to the health care industry; while the FBI (2012) estimates that 
health care fraud costs the U.S. economy upwards of $80 billion. The majority of medical 
identity theft survey participants do not understand the costs, risks and consequences to 
consumers. These risks can take the form of inaccurate information in a medical file, 
which can then result in incorrect diagnoses, prescriptions or treatment delays (Ponemon, 
2013). They also do not understand the implications of sharing medical credentials or 
how to reduce their chances of financial or medical consequences.  
Ponemon (2013) also reported that the most common cause of data loss is due to 
employee carelessness in the form of lost or stolen laptops or mobile devices. 
Correspondingly, criminal attacks have also risen from 20 percent in 2012 to over 33 
percent in 2013 (Ponemon, 2013). They also report that the data most often stolen are 





employees to use their own mobile devices to connect to health care facility networks. 
Ponemon (2013) reports that an average of 50 percent of employees bring their mobile 
devices into health care facilities with an average of 81 percent of the facilities permitting 
this use. In light of these statistics, the report that only one-third of facilities are equipped 
to detect medical identity theft is especially concerning (Ponemon, 2013).  
The black market value of stolen medical data is estimated to be higher than that 
of social security numbers. Gordon (2013) reports that medical identities are traded at a 
rate 20 to 50 times higher than that of financial identities (Gordon, 2013). As financial 
identity theft risks and prevention have become more prominent, consumers are educated 
on how to protect their sensitive data, such as social security number. This is generally 
not so with medically identifying data; therefore people may be less careful guarding its 
privacy (Gordon, 2013).  
In addition to financial concerns, safety and quality of care concerns exist with 
medical identity theft. Taitsman et al., (2013) points out that incorrect information in a 
patient's record can affect any decision making on the patient's behalf. People have been 
incorrectly diagnosed with HIV or diabetes when those with the real ailment sought care 
under the victim's name. Pharmacists or medical care suppliers have also rejected claims 
for needed medical equipment or prescriptions when it was shown to have already been 
obtained by the fraudulent party (Taitsman et al., 2013). 
 Researchers Levy and Royne (2009) present their findings of how HIPAA can be 
circumvented, which can allow patient data to be viewed or exploited. They explain how 
health care entities can release patient data to insurance companies or third party payers. 





focus in on specific patients for marketing purposes or to address health care needs for 
certain conditions. Patients may give this authorization within the context of privacy 
agreements and not have a complete understanding to what they are ultimately agreeing. 
These types of disclosures can take the form of appointment reminders, health-related 
events, notifications of care options and even fundraising activities. These electronic 
transactions can expose a patient's data during the preparation and transmission stages 
(Levy & Royne, 2009). 
Levy and Royne (2009) further discuss how a patient may be unaware that they 
must specifically opt out of some situational marketing strategies. Unless this option is 
chosen, their identifying information, such as name, age, and other data not related to the 
specific medical condition may be included in fundraising or marketing campaigns. Levy 
and Royne (2009) state that patients may not even be aware of how their information 
migrated to these marketing lists.  
Insurance companies and their practices are also discussed by Levy and Royne 
(2009). They point out that medical information gathered during employment is not 
covered by HIPAA, nor is medical information, such as specific conditions, prescriptions 
and referrals, residing in the school records of children. Even if marketing is not the goal 
of the schools, it may be transferred or given to organizations that use it for that purpose 
(Levy & Royne, 2009).  
Levy and Royne (2009) point out community health screenings, such as 
cholesterol checks and blood screenings that may be found in shopping centers or 
pharmacies, are additional vulnerable access points to patient records. These can draw 





The data collected from these screenings can be used for targeted marketing campaigns. 
The authors point out that the patients may be especially vulnerable to compromise as 
they may not be able to afford to visit a doctor or other health care facility (Levy & 
Royne, 2009). 
Other areas of concern include Internet surveys or services that can exploit those 
who are trying to get medical advice or help online. People may complete these surveys 
to get free coupons and may end up on a marketer's mailing list. These types of surveys 
are especially effective as few users read the privacy policies on websites (Levy & Royne, 
2009).  
 
2.3 Number of People Affected 
The Ponemon Institute (2013) states that about nine percent of the United States 
adult population of adults have been victims of identity fraud, with six percent of those 
victims of medical identity theft. This number translates to approximately 1.85 million 
people. The Department of Health and Human Services (2012) report that between the 
end of 2009 and the end of 2011, over 13,000 Medicare and Medicaid participants had 
their medical data breached. They reported to Congress in 2010 that over 5 million 
people were affected by large breaches of over 500 members at each occurrence. 
Kierkegaard (2012) states that there were over 375 breaches resulting in almost eight 
million records compromised and exposed. This figure does not reflect smaller breaches 






2.4 Types of Liability 
Various types of liability can occur with medical identify theft. Gordon (2013) 
describes how the impact of medical identity theft can be more complex than that of 
financial crime. A patient may be denied care or health insurance, turned down for a job 
based on inaccurate medical records or put in collections for bills rendered in their name. 
Taitsman et al, (2013) discusses how a patient may not only face financial issues from 
fraudulently obtained medical services but may be impacted by exhausted benefit limits if 
they must seek medical treatment for themselves (Taitsman et al., 2013). Mancilla and 
Moczygemba (2009) point out that in addition to personal damage, legal, financial and 
public image costs may occur at the organizational level, such as a health entity failing to 
perform due diligence to prevent medical identity theft. 
 
2.5 Types of Breaches 
Mancilla and Moczygemba (2009) suggest that growing numbers of healthcare 
workers are involved directly or indirectly in health care fraud either by committing it or 
allowing it to happen. They present their findings from a study that explored admitting 
and registration practices used by acute health care entities to suggest standards that may 
help to identify and reduce medical identity theft. They found that most medical identity 
theft occurrences happen in the emergency departments, as drug seeking individuals may 
try to hide their identity from authorities for other criminal activities.  As many urgent 
care facilities do require a form of identification, the authors found that emergency 





more difficult , photo identification storage is likely to be fragmented in larger healthcare 
systems, if it present at all. Additionally, they state that timing issues during the 
admission process may impact the adherence to organizational policies in place to curb 
medical identity theft (Mancilla & Moczygemba, 2009). 
Mancilla and Moczygemba (2009) suggest mitigations from their study, which 
include addressing the challenges and time constraints of those in the admitting process, 
specifically in emergency departments. They state that training and compliance measures 
need to be in place for admitting and registration departments. They suggest 
implementing medical identity theft identification and training as part of new employee 
processes as well as periodic retraining programs. Additionally, they discuss presenting 
information to consumers at the point of care. Their findings that emergency rooms 
generate a large portion of medical identity theft occurrences suggests that emergency 
and acute healthcare providers should educate consumers as they take measures to 
educate staff and implement medical identify theft policies and procedures (Mancilla & 
Moczygemba, 2009). 
Consumers are not the only victims of impersonation or theft, physicians can be 
impacted as well. Agrawal and Budetti (2012) discuss physician identity theft and how 
identifying information such as National Provider Identifier (NPI) or Tax Identification 
Number (TIN) can be assumed or stolen. They report that over 12,000 cases of this type 
of compromise were reported to the FTC between 2007-2009. They discuss two general 
methods for this type of compromise: ordering or referring a patient for service or 





rendered in either situation. In addition, false facilities may be set up using compromised 
or stolen physician credentials (Agrawal & Budetti, 2012). 
Risk factors for this type of fraud are primarily through complicity on the part of 
the physician. Agrawal and Budetti (2012) report that those who allow the misuse of their 
indentifying information are at an exponentially greater risk of theft. This category of 
misuse accounts for a small percentage of fraud. They report other risk factors including 
the public use of the NPI as an identifier by health care facilities. The large numbers of 
health care entities the physician may need to make their NPI available to also increases 
the potential for fraud. These organizations may make them available to staff or multiple 
organizations they may be involved with, dramatically increasing the visibility or 
vulnerability of their information (Agrawal & Budetti, 2012). 
Even with policies and procedures in place, the human factor comes into play in a 
range of ways that can compromise patient data security. Electronic eavesdropping 
happens when patient data is transmitted over an unsecured wireless network. Anyone 
within range of the network can capture unencrypted patient data with a laptop computer 
(Taitsman et al., 2013). Health care workers can further obstruct security efforts by 
neglecting to sign off a system session or multiple sessions on computers or devices out 
of their vision. Portable or home-based health care devices compound these issues 







The FTC (2012) recommends reviewing Medicare summary notices, explanations 
of benefits and credit reports for signs of inaccurate or fraudulent information. Some of 
the areas to scrutinize include dates of service, duplicate billing, collection notices, and 
charges for unneeded or unperformed services. In addition, shredding all identifying 
documents before disposal as well as destroying any identifying information on 
prescription bottles is recommended (FTC, 2012). When visiting websites that host 
patient or insurance websites, consumers should access the privacy policies that will 
specify how information is collected, shared, who may have access to it and how it is 
stored. Consumers should also look for features that indicate the website is secure, such 
as the 'https' at the beginning of an URL. The FTC also recommends obtaining a copy of 
their medical records, which requires collection from each health care provider as there is 
no common source for records. Consumers must be given a written reason if their 
requests are denied (FTC, 2010). 
The Department of Health and Human Services (2012) suggests guarding 
Medicare and social security cards as well as using caution toward anyone offering free 
medical services who may request these methods of identification. They further stress 
avoiding those who solicit identifying information over the phone or internet, and to 
refuse to lend their identifying information to anyone (HHS, 2012). Taitsman et al., (2013) 
stresses best care practices to ensure computer and network security concerning patient 
care. Since there is no national framework for electronic health information, they 





protocols (Taitsman et al., 2013). In addition, they discuss risks in hospital and health 
care settings, such as failing to log out of username accounts, and the importance of 
maintaining security and privacy protocols on mobile devices and laptops (Taitsman et al., 
2013).  
Social engineering is also a risk with identifying health information. Taitsman et 
al., (2013) discuss social engineering used against patients and hospital staff to gain 
access to patient information. Perpetrators may call a doctor's office or health care facility 
posing as referring physicians, pharmacies, vendors or insurance companies. They stress 
the importance of educating staff to verify the caller's identity and only release necessary 
information. They describe how patients should be educated on privacy concerns to help 
them reduce their chances of becoming an identity theft victim. A key point is  how 
insurers can help in the reduction of identity theft by educating consumers on the 
importance of reviewing their explanations of benefits. These documents should be sent 
when procedures are performed. A caveat here is that many state Medicaid programs do 
not routinely send these documents, preventing early detection for this segment of 
patients (Taitsman et al., 2013).  
Agrawal and Budetti (2012) also advocate involving patients in reviewing 
medical documentation to ensure against medical and physician identity theft. They  
discuss physician vigilance when beginning or ending a business relationship with health 
care entities and monitoring billings under their name (Agrawal & Budetti, 2012). 
Fernandez-Aleman (2013) discuss their review of articles focusing on medical record 
security and privacy. Their findings show that there are common recommendations across 





of security techniques centered around digital signatures with public key infrastructure 
and passwords combined with the public key infrastructure. Some interesting findings 
show the necessity to override policies in the case of emergency and the relative lack of 
articles that stress the importance of health care staff or system users training on security 
and privacy issues and policies. Other findings show audit logs are advocated by a 
majority of articles (Fernandez-Aleman, 2013).  
The Medical Identity Fraud Alliance was created to address some of these issues. 
Compromised of representatives from stakeholders across the healthcare spectrum, the 
Alliance is designed to develop awareness and education for both the public and 
healthcare sectors by developing standards and practices to detect and prevent medical 
identity theft through a public, private sector partnership (Gordon, 2013). 
The Affordable Care Act adds some additional safeguards for Medicare and 
Medicaid programs. The new policies provide: 
• A strict screening process for participant categories that have a pattern of      
fraudulent activity. 
• New policy that States will have to examine service providers that refer 
provide Medicaid recipients for histories of fraudulent activity. Any service 
provider already banned from another State's Medicare or Medicaid 
program will be banned from all State's Medicare and Medicaid programs. 
• Using predictive software to detect patterns or areas of fraudulent activity so 
that enrollment in that area may be stopped or examined on a closer level. 
• Stops payments on a temporary basis in cases of suspected fraudulent 





payment activity while an investigation is undertaken (Agrawal & Burdetti, 
2011). 
 
2.7 Risk Knowledge and Online Risk Taking Behavior 
Some of the previous research into information security knowledge and risk 
taking behavior discusses perceived risk and the factors that influence these perceptions 
and how trust can affect consumers purchasing habits and banking behaviors.  The two 
main areas of risk are losing money during , or as a result of,  a transaction and the threat 
of losing privacy or private information (Belada, Jong, & Steehouder, 2010). 
Kim, Ferrin, & Rao (2007) discuss how findings have been shown that consumers 
are reluctant to make purchases from a website unless they trust the merchant. The 
authors define online consumer trust as a consumer's subjective belief that the selling 
party or entity will fulfill its transactional obligations as the consumer understands them.  
They then state than cyber transactions can magnify this effect through characteristics of 
Internet commerce, such as being instantaneous, somewhat anonymous and impersonal. 
They stress that consumers focus much of their trust on the transactional process rather 
than the face-to-face personal relationship of brick and mortar entities can provide.  
Creating an online environment of trust and comfort is a key component to ensuring 
successful ecommerce (Kim, Ferrin, & Rao, 2007).  
Kim et al (2007) continue to discuss how a consumer's perceived risk combines 
with the perceived negative or beneficial effects when making purchasing decisions 





about the potential uncertain negative outcomes from the online transaction. Beldad, Jong 
& Steehouder (2010)  point out that differences exist in offline versus online entities. 
Offline entities only require trust on the seller or company, whereas an online transaction 
requires the consumer to not only trust the website but the organization behind the 
website, typically also with an explanation or demonstration of how the site is 
trustworthy (Beldad, Jong, & Steehouder, 2010).  
Metzger (2006) describes consumer level of trust and risk perception to their level 
of Internet online experience. Beldad et al (2006) theorizes from this study that those 
with high levels of experience with Internet and computer usage have low risk 
perceptions and expectations with online entities and transactions. Aiken and Bousch 
(2006) conducted a study that indicated this correlation between novice and intermediate 
Internet and computer users but not so in the case of intermediate to expert Internet and 
computer users. They describe these findings as an inverted U, where a person's level of 
trust increases in the beginning stages of Internet and computer experience but reduces as 
their level of experience and knowledge with vulnerabilities expands to show all the 
possible risks, which magnifies security and privacy questions. 
Accenture (2014) performed a survey to measure how the ability to access 
medical records online overshadows the privacy invasion risk. They found that 51% of 
patients with chronic conditions were more uneasy about shopping and banking privacy 
concerns than those dealing with healthcare information. The survey found that those 
with chronic conditions (69%) believed that access to all of their patient records was their 
right rather than a privilege. Almost one in five of these patients trusted that their records 





how to access them. Perera, Holbrook, Thabane, Foster & Willison (2011) reinforced this 
finding with their survey of patients and physicians on patient online health records. They 
found that 58% of patients and 70% of physicians believed that benefits of computerized 
health records outweighed the potential loss of confidentiality and privacy.   
 
2.8 Summary 
Electronic medical records continue to expand and evolve. The policies and 
procedures meant to regulate their use according to current laws struggle to address the 
ever changing methods of breaches and  exploitation. While several federal laws exist to 
give a framework to security policies and procedures, lack of appropriate employee 
behavior has a direct effect on this statistic.  Electronic medical record theft can lead to 
identity theft and medical identity theft, which can not only cost consumers and providers 
large sums of money, but can result in injury or death of the patient and liability issues 
for the providers. The largest area of mitigation is education, of both the consumer and 
provider, on the prevalence of medical identity theft and risks that can be detected and 
reduced in the various levels of the data lifecycle. The motivation of this study is to 
determine a consumer's knowledge of these risks in the medical record lifecycle and if 






CHAPTER 3 METHODOLODY 
 The goal of this thesis was to discover if a correlation existed between a person's 
knowledge of information security risk and their comfort level utilizing  medical data 
online. To determine if this correlation existed, a two-part survey was used to first 
determine a user's knowledge of risk and the second to assess their comfort when using 
medical data online. An Internet survey of closed, fixed choice questions was used to 
gather this information. A comparative analysis was then  performed to determine if there 
was indeed a correlation between the two variables and if so, the direction it may lean.  
3.1 Hypothesis 
The study in this thesis used the following hypotheses to assess if this correlation exists: 
 Hα:  There is a correlation between a person's information security risk 
 knowledge and their comfort utilizing online medical data. 
 Ho: There is no significant correlation between a person's information security 








3.2 Study Design 
 A descriptive survey design, was used (see Appendix). The survey consisted of 
two parts: the first determined a user's knowledge of information security risk areas based 
on answers to 19 closed ended questions with five answer choices ranging from very
unlikely to very likely. The second part assessed a user's comfort level using medically 
identifying data online by answering 13 closed ended questions with seven answer 
choices ranging from extremely uncomfortable to extremely comfortable.  
 
3.3 Research Type 
 The purpose of this study was to determine if there was a correlation between the 
two variables, which were a person's information security risk knowledge and their 
comfort using online medical records, and if so, the potential direction of that relationship. 
Acorrelation  analysis was performed to determine if this relationship existed among the 
variables. Correlation measures the association between two variables. Regression 
examines a relationship between a dependent and independent variable. Correlation and 
regression cannot determine a cause and effect relationship, it was used to demonstrate 
how and to what extent the variables may be associated with one another. Correlation 
analysis assumes that this study was using interval levels to measure the variables, that 
there was a linear relationship between the two variables, there were no significant 
outliers, and the variables are approximately normally distributed. A frequency analysis 
was used to determine the number of missing or nonresponses, outliers and the central 






 A descriptive method using Internet surveys was conducted. These surveys were  
posted among various research-centered groups as well as on University reciprocal user 
groups. The purpose was to reach as large of a cross section of Internet users as possible 
to gain an understanding of relationships between and among various demographic and 
geographic populations.  
 
3.5 Participants 
 Internet users were surveyed, with a focus on multiple research centered groups as 
well as those with which the University has reciprocal research agreements. Qualtrics 
was used to prepare, distribute and gather the surveys. The goal was to try to reach as 
large of a cross section of participants as possible with cross sections of various age and 
geographic participants. Qualtrics allowed anonymous surveys that do not track 
participant identifying information. The response rate was the extent to which the final 
data set includes all participants. The equation was the number of participants with whom 
surveys were completed divided by the total number of participants in the entire 
participating group including non-responders. The lower the response rate, the greater the 






3.6 Sampling Approach 
 An Internet based questionnaire was used. The benefits of low cost and 
accessibility made the Internet a good choice for convenience sampling. It was 
administered in a non-probability approach in that it was advertised through the described 
channels and left to the user to choose to participate. This did not allow the researcher to 
determine any type of non-response bias. Recruitment for the convenience sample was 
through Purdue alumni chapters, primarily through social media. A link was sent to those 
people who participated in the group with a description of the survey and a request to 
participate. Convenience sampling systematically excluded some potential participants, 
for example, those who do not subscribe to the Internet. This is known as selection bias, 
or the tendency to exclude one type of unit. This can be a major drawback of convenience 
sampling.  
 
3.7 Sample Size 
 This number considered the application of a power analysis to detect an effect if 
the effect is really there. Statistical power is the probability of rejecting the null 
hypothesis when the alternative hypothesis is true. The power analysis enabled a number 
of participants to detect an effect size, or the magnitude of the effect of interest. The 
factors for this power analysis were the confidence level of 95%, standard deviation of .5 
and margin of error of +/-5.  A prospective power analysis was performed using these 





which would determine strength of the relationship, or correlation, between the two 
variables.  
3.8 Tests/Instruments 
 The measures were a two-part survey (see Appendix). The first portion consisted 
of  questions that scored a user's knowledge of risk as determined by terms defined by the 
researcher. These scores were measured in a five point Likert scale that ranged from 
extremely unlikely to extremely likely. The second was a seven point Likert scale that 
rated user comfort. The seven points were used to help dissuade "middle" answers. This 
survey asked closed ended questions that assessed a user's comfort level in the use of 
online medical data. 
 
3.9 Variables 
 There were two variables of interest in this study. The independent variable was 
the user's level of information security risk knowledge. The dependent variable was the 
user's comfort level with utilizing online medical data. The researcher aimed to determine 
a relationship between the two and if so, what direction the relationship was taking. This 
was be done by using a 2-tailed t test. The 2 tailed t test takes half of the alpha to measure 
one direction and half of the alpha to measure the other direction. Since the alpha, or 
confidence interval, in this test was .5, the alpha was divided into .25 for each tail. This 






3.10 Assessment Instruments 
 The statistical software package SPSS was used to compute Cronbach's Alpha, 
which is a measure of internal reliability. This measure was appropriate for Likert scales 
to determine if the scales are consistent. SPSS also calculated the correlation  analysis to 
determine if any relationship existed between the two variables and if any were present, 
which direction they may have taken. A two tailed t test was used to determine the means 
of the two variables. A correlation analysis was used to determine how the variables vary 
together.  
 
3.11 Data Collection Methods 
 A two-part survey was used for this study. The first portion was a set of 19 
questions that scored a user's knowledge of risk into a five point Likert scale. The second 
portion was a seven point Likert survey that asked 13 closed ended questions about the 
user's comfort level with their use of medically identifying data. The data collected were 
the responses to the interval Likert questions given in each section. In addition, age and 
gender responses were collected.  
 
3.12 Analysis 
 The analysis was conducted to determine if there was a correlation between the 
two variables and if so, what direction it may have taken. Testing the null hypothesis to 





their comfort level utilizing online medical data was the purpose of the analysis. The 
correlation analysis was used to show if there was a positive or negative direction in the 
data, in this case, if there was a positive or negative difference on a user's information 
security risk knowledge with their utilization of online medical data. A Pearson's 
correlation test was used to determine how well the two variables were related, or tested 
the strength of a linear association between the two.  The minimum score of  r = .02 was  
used as the threshold of interest. The analysis was further measured by gender and age of 





CHAPTER 4 DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
This chapter presents the results of the data collection and analysis. Data was 
collected in relation to the issues presented in the previous chapters. Two areas of interest 
were using a survey to measure a person's information security risk knowledge and their 
level of comfort using online medical records. The purpose of the data collection was to 
measure the correlation between information security risk knowledge and a person's 
comfort level using online medical records. The data collected and processed from these 
surveys were analyzed and the findings are presented in this chapter.  
 
4.1 Analysis Statistics 
Pearson's correlation was used to evaluate the null hypothesis that there is no 
correlation between user's information security risk knowledge and their comfort using 
online medical records (n=109). Results of the analysis yielded that there was no 
statistically significant correlation between a user's information security risk knowledge 
and their comfort using online medical records  (r=0.132, df=107, p=0.169); correcting 
for the reliabilities of the two scales, the estimated correlation was 0.170. The results 





4.2 Response Rate 
The online survey software Qualtrics was used to prepare and administer the test. 
The test was made publicly available after receiving IRB approval on February 25, 2015. 
The test was accessed through a weblink placed inside an invitation posted to several 
Purdue Alumni Facebook groups. The survey was made available for two weeks from 
February 25 through March 14, 2015. A total of 121 responses were received during that 
period. Of that number, 109 were fully completed (meaning both blocks one and two) 
while 10 were partially completed (block one completed or partially completed while 
block two was either partially or totally uncompleted). One survey was missing entirely. 
With 109 useable surveys out of 120 total surveys returns a response rate of just over 
90.8%.  
The respondents were overwhelmingly female (68%), and over 55, with 46% of 
the respondents in this age bracket. 









Table 4.2 Gender Breakdown of Participants 
 
4.3 Missing Data 
Of the 121 surveys returned, 109 were fully completed, both block one, which 
referenced information security risk knowledge, and block two, which referenced comfort 
using online medical records. One survey was missing, and of the remaining 10 partially 
completed, only three completed block one, either partially or completely. Of those three, 
none completed block two. Since the block one respondents' mean responses did not 
differ significantly in relation to the means for the 109 respondents with complete data,  
the researcher chose to include them in the survey analysis.  Allison (2002) discusses 
how this can be justified by the non-block two respondents being generally not 
statistically significant from those respondents who did answer block two. That missing 
data from block two might be missing at random (where the missing data does not predict 
missingness); they may instead be missing completely at random. If the responses in 
block one were generally different, that would then mean that they would predict 






4.4 Correlation Analysis 
While the overall correlation did not support the alternative  hypothesis of this 
thesis, there were statistically significant correlations within the matrix. Statistically 
significant correlations were judged to be of practical interest if they were less than -0.2 
or greater than 0.2. There are seven negative correlations between blocks one and two. 
There were also 12 statistically significant (r>.2) positive correlations between blocks one 
and two.  
The strongest correlation involved question 33, which asked the respondent's 
comfort sharing insurance credentials with a family member (refer to appendix). This 
question gathered six of the seven (statistically significant and practically significant) 
correlations between blocks one and two. Block one categorized information security risk 
responses while block two responses categorized medical data comfort level. . This 
question was asked in a recoded manner, meaning that it was asked so that the better 
answer would be to respond in the opposite manner as the other questions. This coupled 
with the ambiguous nature of the questions may indicate why it showed a heavy negative 
correlation to some of the other questions. The respondents may have considered this to 
be a question with a negative response rather than a positive, as was the case with the 







 Block 1 questions scored a Cronbach'a alpha of  .66 with 17 questions. This 
figure falls short of the .70 considered to be a quality score of reliability but can still be 
useful.  
The block 2 score was much higher at .92 measuring 13 questions. This showed 
generally stronger correlations among the questions; respondents tended more to give 
uniformly high or uniformly low ratings. The correlation between the two scales can be 
corrected for attenuation (reliability). The low score form the first block of questions 
would be most responsible for the attenuation. 
 
4.6 Age and Gender Analysis 
 The reported differences between age and gender were notable on several 
questions for each. The group above 55 showed responses which were more conservative 
for three of the information security risk questions and one of the comfort level questions. 
Independent samples t tests were analyzed to compare variability between the two groups.  
The t tests shown in table 4.3 below, indicates that the above 55 group were more 
cautious when accepting social media friend requests and less comfortable sharing 
insurance information with family members. They were more likely than the under 55 
age group to feel that they could determine a phishing attempt, and were more careful 







Table 4.3 T Tests by Age  
 
 
 The differences between mean ratings from men and women is consistent across 
most of the responses, with women reporting lower mean ratings than men; this persisted 
across both blocks of the survey. The independent samples t tests, which compares 
variability between the two groups, shows four questions which had  statistically 
significantly lower mean responses for women (α<.25). Women were more likely to 
reuse passwords, participate in online contests, and were also less likely to feel 





CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The original hypothesis sought to determine if there was a correlation between a 
person's information security risk knowledge and their comfort using online medical 
records. While there were multiple positive and negative correlations within the two 
groups, the overall correlation was too small to reject the null hypothesis.  
 
5.1 Limitations 
 While the survey results did not support the alternate hypothesis, several factors 
could have affected the responses from the respondents, or their interpretation of the 
questions. The questions were asked in two directions, that is, some questions were asked 
if a higher score meant a better answer while others indicated a higher score was a less 
desirable answer. These questions were mixed in the first block of questions. In the 
second block of questions, there was only one question that was the opposite direction of 
all the others, and that was the question that scored the most negative correlation between 
the two blocks.  
The reliability among the questions may have also had an impact on the survey 
responses. Cronbach's alpha indicated that the variability among the first group was more 
that the second block. This means that the second block of questions appears to be a more 





the data that the survey intended. The first block does not seem to share this reliability. 
This may be due in part to the mixed direction of the questions in block one.  
Time constraints also played a part in the collection of survey data. The time 
between the Institutional Review Board permission and the thesis milestones was short, 
not allowing for more data collection. While the respondents were sufficient to perform 
data analysis, more responses and more varied respondents would have given the analysis 
more statistical power.  
 
5.2 Discussion 
The strongest correlations were negative, which indicated that as the value for one 
variable increased, the value for the other variable decreased. For these correlations, the 
presence of one negatively impacted the other. While this was an interesting discovery, it 
was opposite of what the researcher suspected may be true. The positive correlation for 
information risk and comfort using financial data  has been shown to be true (e.g. higher 
levels of information security risk knowledge were associated with more comfort using 
financial data online). This same correlation between the two study variables was the 
primary factor for performing this study as well.  
There were nine questions that were recoded as they were asked in an opposite 
scale as the other questions. This means that if a positive response was a lower number, 
these nine questions would then deem a higher response as positive. The presence of 
these questions within the survey may have played a part in the lack of correlation as 





meant that participants were answering what they deemed a socially desirable answer, 
meaning that they were answering the way they deemed the correct or positive response 
desired by the researcher. The placement of these recoded questions could have mislead 
participants to the nature of the question.  
There was one question that garnered four of the seven negative correlations. That 
question asked if a person felt comfortable sharing their insurance credentials with family 
members. The researcher posed this as a potentially negative response question, meaning 
that feeling more comfortable was a negative answer, and coded as such. The question 
could have been viewed as being positive in that the family member may have been a 
spouse, thereby potentially sharing insurance credentials, which the researcher did not 
take into account.  
While age and gender analysis were not part of the hypothesis, they were 
variables of interest. The suspected outcome was that younger participants would be 
more exposed to technology and its risks, and therefore more conservative with their 
comfort level using online medical records due to this exposure. Since the correlation 
between information security risk and comfort using online financial data has been shown, 
the researcher suspected that younger participants would be more aware of information 
security concerns in general, due to their increased potential of technology use in school 
and personal use. What was reported, however, was that those over 55 reported more 
conservative responses than those under 55. This means that the older respondents were 
more cautious in their response to the information security concepts. It is difficult to 
perform more in depth analysis of this phenomenon as the age groups are not consistently 





lower statistical power, meaning that the number of those participants may have been too 
low to detect any differences. Women also reported lower information security risk 
knowledge on four questions and less comfort on one medical record use question.  
The respondent base was taken from Purdue Alumni groups, it may be assumed 
that the respondents were educated and in the older age categories. An educated 
respondent pool may be more knowledgeable, and savvy about internet use, and therefore 
the risks associated with it. This could influence the older age group answering more 
conservatively than the younger group.  
The over 55 group may also be more exposed to online medical records because 
they have more reason to be exposed to them through age related health issues. They may 
simply be more experienced through necessity. The same could be said about insurance 
attitudes. They may be more experienced through repetition and experience with medical 
records and insurance companies in general, translating to comfort interacting with them 
online. The experience level of a online medical record user and their comfort level using 
insurance and medical data could be a valuable area of interest for medical data and 
insurance stakeholders  
Although the alternative hypothesis was not supported, there remains some 
interesting conclusions that can be drawn from the survey. There were several 
statistically significant correlations that were found between both age and gender groups 
despite the lack of overall correlation in the survey. Future work that focuses on further 
documenting the difference in information security risk knowledge and comfort between 
men and women and those in different age groups, specifically those over 55 may be an 





consistently lower mean scores that men across both information security risk knowledge 
and comfort using online medical records? Work that seeks to determine what factors 
could influence these lower scores would be a viable study.  
 Seeking to determine why those groups report different attitudes and behaviors 
could provide a valuable insight for technology stakeholders. Determining why age and 
gender plays a role in how a person interacts with technology, specifically online medical 
data could be important, especially as the percentage of the population over 55 increases. 
Insurance companies and other stakeholders that can gain a better understanding of how 
their customers view and use their technology would be better able to then provide online 
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3. I use an anti virus program on my computer 
Yes No    Not sure 
4. I have an anti spyware filter installed on my system 
Yes No    Not sure 
The next set of questions will ask about your use of computer-based activities. How 
likely are you to perform the following: 
5.Keep your antivirus program updated 
Very Likely Likely   Somewhat Unlikely Very Unlikely 
6. Open an email attachment sent by a friend 
Very Likely Likely   Somewhat Unlikely Very Unlikely 
7. Download executable files 
Very Likely Likely   Somewhat Unlikely Very Unlikely 
8. Install a found USB drive on my computer to see what it contained 
Very Likely Likely   Somewhat Unlikely Very Unlikely 
9. Share my passwords with friends or family members 
Very Likely Likely   Somewhat Unlikely Very Unlikely 





Very Likely Likely   Somewhat Unlikely     Very Unlikely 
11. Participate in online contests 
Very Likely Likely   Somewhat Unlikely     Very Unlikely 
12. Accept requests on social media from someone you don't know 
Very Likely Likely   Somewhat Unlikely     Very Unlikely 
13. Sign off your profile when you step away from your computer 
Very Likely Likely   Somewhat Unlikely     Very Unlikely 
14. Reuse passwords 
Very Likely Likely   Somewhat Unlikely     Very Unlikely 
15. Enable automatic software updates on my system 
Very Likely Likely   Somewhat Unlikely     Very Unlikely 
The next set of questions will ask how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement 
16. I do not access personal information over public networks 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral   Disagree   Strongly disagree 
17. I feel that I can recognize a phishing attempt 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral   Disagree   Strongly disagree 
18. I know how to determine if a network uses encryption 
Strongly agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly disagree 
19. If I shop online, I ensure that the website uses encryption 
Strongly agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly disagree 
20. My passwords are stored in a secure location 
Strongly agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree    Strongly disagree 





Strongly agree   Agree   Neutral   Disagree   Strongly disagree 
Codebook for answers 
3-7 Antivirus/malware 18-19 Encryption 
8-13 Security control  20. Passwords 
14. Password   21. Identity theft 
15-16 Security control 
17. Identity theft   
Part 2. Activities and Comfort level 
1. Do you use a patient portal to access your medical records 
Yes   No 
2. How many times have you visited a patient portal in the last 90 days? 
0-10   11-20   21-30   31-40   41-50   51+ 
On a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 being extremely uncomfortable and 7 being extremely 
comfortable, please rate your level of comfort with the following activities 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Extremely uncomfortable     Extremely comfortable 
3. Communicating with your physician through the patient portal 
4. Refilling prescriptions through the portal 
5. Accessing medical tests through the portal 
6. Updating medical information through the portal 
7. Reviewing medical information through the portal 
8. Accessing insurance information online 





10. Changing or updating insurance information online 
11. Receiving insurance billing exclusively online 
12. Sharing insurance credentials with a family member or friend 
13. Registering for a medical procedure online 
14. Paying a medical bill through the portal 




































































Figure B.5 (continued)  
 
 
